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One of the most important objectives of the Australian Centre of Excellence for Local Government 
(ACELG) is to support informed debate on key policy issues. ACELG’s working paper series thus aims 
to fills some of the gaps in the policy debate from a local government perspective, and to stimulate 
discussion. 
 
This is one of several ACELG papers that explore problems and opportunities in metropolitan 
governance, planning and management, and local government’s role in those fields. In 2009 and 
2010 ACELG joined with the Canada-based Forum of Federations to host international roundtables 
on metropolitan governance in Sydney and Brisbane. Reports are available on ACELG’s website at 
www.acelg.org.au. In 2011-12, ACELG funded and published research by John Abbott into 
collaborative governance and metropolitan planning in South East Queensland, partnering with the 
Council of Mayors and the (then) Queensland Department of Local Government and Planning. That 
report can also be found on the ACELG website.  
 
To varying degrees Australia’s major metropolitan regions all face acute social, economic and 
environmental challenges. Calls for reform of metropolitan management tend to focus either on the 
need for increased federal funding and involvement, or on perceived problems associated with the 
fragmentation of local government into a large number of relatively or absolutely small council 
areas. Yet Australia has a unique model of metropolitan governance, in which state governments are 
directly responsible for all the key elements of planning and major infrastructure and service 
delivery. And the recent report on ‘capital city’ strategic planning systems by the COAG Reform 
Council made it clear that the states’ performance in metropolitan management is patchy at best. 
This paper explores the issues involved with particular reference to Perth and South East 
Queensland. 
 
The genesis of the working paper was a further international collaboration led by the Forum of 
Federations to produce a book of comparative studies into metropolitan governance and finance in 
federal countries. ACELG is grateful to the Forum and its publisher for permission to release this 
modified version of the Australian chapter of that book.  
 
Feedback on the content and findings of ACELG working papers is always welcome. As well, we value 
suggestions from local government practitioners and other stakeholders regarding needs and 





Professor and Director 
Australia Centre for Excellence in Local Government 
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Australia’s metropolitan regions have many more similarities than differences.  They are of similar 
age and cultural origins, support similar lifestyles and offer comparable social, cultural and economic 
opportunities.  The two regions examined in some detail in this paper – Perth and the South East 
Queensland region centered on Brisbane – can thus be seen as representative, although they are the 
fastest growing and display some distinctive characteristics in terms of governance and planning.  A 
study of the two regions can therefore offer valuable insights into how metropolitan growth and 
change might be more effectively managed into the future, within the context of Australia’s federal 
system. 
 
Australia has a unique model of metropolitan governance, in which each state government is directly 
responsible for planning and major infrastructure and service delivery in the state’s dominant urban 
region.  The states have the constitutional and legislative powers to undertake almost all aspects of 
metropolitan planning and management. Those powers have been compromised to some degree by 
the states’ growing dependence on federal financial support, but remain more or less absolute in 
terms of their control over land use planning, metropolitan infrastructure and services, and local 
government. The federal government could be a much more significant player, given its financial 
clout, but to date its interventions in metropolitan affairs have been relatively low-key. 
 
Local government has limited functions and tends to be fragmented into units that are too small to 
play a major role – although this is changing – and there are no ‘upper tier’ metropolitan-scale 
councils. South East Queensland is an exception: the main metropolitan area is managed by just 
seven large local councils, and the central City of Brisbane houses close to 40% of the population as 
well most commercial and industrial activities, and could thus be considered to some degree a 
‘metropolitan council’. However, even in South East Queensland the state outspends local 
government by a ratio of around 6:1; in Perth that figure increases to 9:1. 
 
The central issue in metropolitan governance thus becomes the way in which state governments 
organise themselves to discharge their responsibilities in an efficient and effective manner. Yet there 
has been a tendency to place as much or more emphasis on problems associated with the 
fragmentation of metropolitan regions into a large number of local government areas, than on the 
performance of state governments as metropolitan managers. 
 
Calls for reform reflect the pressures of growth: Australia’s major metropolitan regions are all 
growing rapidly, and there is rising community concern about the environmental and social impacts 
of increasing populations, outward sprawl and redevelopment of established suburbs.  Whilst 
Australian cities continue to rate highly on international scales of livability, there is a popular 
perception that quality of life and that of major urban services – public transport, education and 
health – is declining, at least relative to rising community expectations.  
 
As noted above, the federal government has played only a limited role in metropolitan governance, 
although its constitutional powers in areas such as immigration, communications, aviation, taxation 
and economic management set the context for metropolitan growth, and its financial dominance 
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over the states allows it to intervene in some metropolitan policy and expenditure decisions – 
notably major infrastructure projects. The current government has established Infrastructure 
Australia as a semi-independent body to draft and help implement a national program of major 
projects, including roads and transport improvements in metropolitan regions.  It has also created a 
Major Cities Unit which has developed a National Urban Policy focused on strategies for the 
country’s 18 largest cities and metropolitan regions – those with populations in excess of 100,000.  
However, the longer term significance of these moves has yet to become clear. 
 
In addition, at the urging of the federal government, in 2009 the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) adopted a set of Criteria for Future Strategic Planning of Capital Cities (that is, metropolitan 
regions).  The COAG Reform Council was subsequently tasked to review strategic planning systems 
against those criteria. Its recent report made it clear that the states’ performance in metropolitan 
management is patchy at best.  Typically, the major bureaucracies and service agencies operate in 
silos with only limited coordination.  Planning departments prepare metropolitan strategies and 
regulate development in conjunction with local government and environmental protection 
authorities, but in practice their powers and influence are usually limited compared to those of big 
spending infrastructure and service organisations.   
 
The Reform Council found that coordination both within state governments and between the states 
and federal and local governments, needs to be improved considerably. None of the states has a 
dedicated agency or authority charged specifically and exclusively with coordinating governance and 
management of the metropolitan region.  The Western Australian Planning Commission and ‘Growth 
Management Queensland’ (now part of the Department of State Development, Infrastructure and 
Planning) come closest, but in both cases have additional, state-wide responsibilities.   
 
At the same time, governments at all levels are faced with the heavy cost of providing for both 
growth and improvement, and it is questionable whether this can be achieved within current policy 
settings. There are already some significant backlogs in infrastructure systems, notably public 
transport, due to under-investment over recent decades.  Hence calls for the federal government to 
play a larger role and lend its financial support. As well, significant policy conflicts need to be 
addressed:  for example, maintenance of housing affordability is seen to require downward pressure 
on infrastructure charges levied on residential development, but how otherwise is infrastructure to 
be funded?  
 
Whilst the current federal government has committed substantial funding to major infrastructure 
projects, notably urban transport, the sums involved fall far short of what the states need.  Nor is 
there any clear indication that the National Urban Policy will be accompanied by an increased and 
ongoing financial commitment to address the issues raised.  Indeed, for the foreseeable future the 
federal government will be focused on fiscal tightening to bring its budget back into surplus 
following massive stimulus spending during the Global Financial Crisis, as well as the heavy cost of 
disaster recovery after recent cyclones and floods. 
 
Unless these critical financial and policy issues can be resolved – which would seem to require 
governments, business and the community to face up to the need for higher taxes and/or charges, 
possibly increased land tax or congestion pricing as suggested in the Henry tax review – it is difficult 
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to see adjustments to metropolitan governance and planning arrangements having much strategic 
impact.  The underlying problems will continue to accumulate. On the other hand,  if the necessary 
resources can be found, the ‘Australian model’ of state governments being responsible for both 
metropolitan regions and their hinterlands, and directly providing most services, should provide a 
platform for sound, integrated planning and governance.   
 
In that regard, there may well be a case for the states to establish – or in some cases re-establish – 
metropolitan ‘commissions’ or the like. Such bodies could provide a responsible forum and focus for 
coordination of metropolitan planning, services and infrastructure, and for the expression of 
metropolitan community views and aspirations. Alternatively, or as a complementary measure, the 
states could introduce new processes and mechanisms for collaborative governance amongst their 
agencies and with federal and local governments, the business sector and a range of key community 
stakeholders. Arrangements in South East Queensland and Perth offer valuable pointers to the kind 
of arrangements that need to be developed. Joint state-local government commitment and 
leadership appears essential.   
 
This leaves the continuing vexed issue of the appropriate role, scale and structures of local 
government in metropolitan regions, which has attracted so much attention. However, whilst local 
government consolidation may well be desirable if councils are expected to play a stronger role, the 
dominance of the states means that having numerous, relatively small local governments does not 
necessarily equate with fragmentation of metropolitan governance, provided the states organize 
themselves to do the job. If critical challenges are to be met, and desired outcomes achieved, the 
states must more explicitly acknowledge and accept their responsibilities as metropolitan (as well as 
state) governments. The ‘Australian model’ requires them to give integrated metropolitan 
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This paper explores what may be called the ‘Australian model’ of metropolitan governance. That 
model has not been driven by theory or even by deliberate policy.  Instead, it is the almost inevitable 
consequence of the establishment of separate colonies scattered around the coast of a vast and dry 
continent, leading to six states each with a single metropolitan region where most of the population 
live and work. It is a model built on the constitutional and legislative powers of state governments to 
dominate almost all aspects of metropolitan planning, infrastructure provision, service delivery, and 
local and regional governance. Those powers have been compromised to some degree by the 
renewed interest of the federal government in the economic and social development of ‘major 
cities’, and by the states’ growing fiscal difficulties and dependence on federal financial support, but 
remain more or less absolute in terms of the states’ control over land use planning, metropolitan 
infrastructure and services, and local government.  
 
The weak position of local government makes the dynamic of Australian metropolitan governance 
very different from that in comparable countries such as the UK, Canada, New Zealand and USA. Yet 
there has been a tendency to place as much or more emphasis on perceived problems associated 
with the fragmentation of metropolitan regions into a large number of local government areas, than 
on the performance of state governments as metropolitan managers. 
 
Australia’s metropolitan regions have many more similarities than differences.  They are of similar 
age and cultural origins.  They are all coastal, and they all sprawl.  They support similar lifestyles and 
offer comparable social, cultural and economic opportunities.  Of course there are historical and 
other variations in terms of climate, size, ethnicity, growth rates and the drivers of the state 
economy, but in global terms these differences are marginal. 
 
The two regions examined in some detail in this paper – Perth and the South East Queensland region 
centred on Brisbane – can thus be seen as representative, although they are the fastest growing and 
display some distinctive characteristics in terms of governance and planning.  A study of Perth and 
South East Queensland can therefore offer valuable insights into how metropolitan growth and 
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1. National Context 
 
Australia’s six colonies were established between 1788 (New South Wales) and 1836 (South 
Australia).  The most striking feature of Australian settlement was that it was primarily urban, and 
from the earliest days a primary interest of colonial governments was in founding and running a 
capital city. 
 
Today, over 60% of the population is concentrated in the six major metropolitan regions around the 
state capitals of Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth, Adelaide and Hobart (see Figure 1).  With a 
national population of less than 23 million, even the largest of these metropolitan regions remain 
relatively small by global standards, but due to their low residential densities they cover large areas, 
and in the case of Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane (South East Queensland) are now multi-centred.           
 
Figure 1:  Population distribution in Australia    
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2008 
 
Population growth is currently around 1.5-2.0 per cent per annum, reflecting high overseas 
immigration.  Table 1 shows Gross Domestic Product (state and national) for the past two financial 
years.  The economies of Queensland and Western Australia have grown especially rapidly over 
recent years due to the accelerating minerals boom.   
 
Table 2 shows recent population growth rates.  South East Queensland was the fastest growing 
region over the period 1996-2006, in both percentage and absolute terms, and this rapid growth is 
continuing.  Perth grew second fastest in percentage terms, and projections by the Australian 
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Bureau of Statistics show these same regions maintaining the highest growth rates over the next two 
decades.  
Table 1:  Gross state and domestic product 
 
GSP 2008-09 $ m* % of GDP GSP 2009-10 $ m % of GDP 
New South Wales             $402,334  32.1%             $406,917  31.7% 
Victoria             $291,637  23.3%             $301,438  23.5% 
Queensland             $243,901  19.5%             $244,160  19.0% 
Western Australia             $169,950  13.6%             $184,438  14.4% 
South Australia               $78,986  6.3%               $80,356  6.3% 
ACT               $25,969  2.1%               $27,773  2.2% 
Tasmania               $23,176  1.8%               $23,340  1.8% 
Northern Territory               $17,168  1.4%               $16,248  1.3% 
Australia (GDP)          $1,253,121  100%         $1,284,670  100% 
* Figures in Australian dollars, but currently at parity with USD.  
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) catalogue Number 5220.0 
 
Table 2:  Metropolitan population growth 1996 to 2006 
Metropolitan Region 
(Statistical Divisions included) 
Population 1996 Population 2006 
Absolute 
Growth 
1996 - 2006 
Percentage 
Growth 
1996 - 2006 
Sydney 
(Sydney SD, Hunter SD, Illawarra SD) 
4,808,237 5,316,379 508,142 10.57% 
Melbourne 
(Melbourne SD, Barwon SD) 
3,522,797 4,014,361 491,564 13.95% 
South East Queensland 
(Brisbane SD, Gold Coast SD, Sunshine 
Coast SD, West Moreton SD) 
2,138,215 2,706,302 568,087 26.57% 
Perth 
(Perth SD) 
1,295,092 1,519,510 224,418 17.33% 
Adelaide 
(Adelaide SD, Outer Adelaide SD) 
1,182,768 1,275,041 92,273 7.80% 
Hobart 
(Greater Hobart SD) 
195,718 205,566 9,846 5.03% 
SD = statistical division   
Source: Planning Information and Forecasting Unit, Queensland Treasury, and ABS Cat. No. 3218 
 
A feature of the larger metropolitan regions, with the exception of Brisbane, is the very small share 
of the total population living in the central ‘capital city’ – less than 4% (see Table 3). This is another 
characteristic that distinguishes metropolitan governance in Australia from that in other advanced 
countries. Thus with urban growth, the name of each capital (‘Sydney’, ‘Perth’ etc) has come to refer 
less to the city government at the centre than to the entire metropolitan region.  Invariably, when 
people refer to the population or character or future or governance of, say, ‘Sydney’, they mean the 
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Capital city population 
2008/09 
Capital city share of 
metro region 
New South Wales 7,238,819 5,316,379 City of Sydney: 177,000 3.3% 
Victoria 5,547,527 4,014,361 City of Melbourne: 89,759 2.2% 
Queensland 4,516,361 2,706,302 Brisbane City: 1,052,458 38.9% 
Western Australia 2,296,411 1,519,510 City of Perth:  17,093 1.1% 
South Australia 1,644,642 1,275,041 City of Adelaide: 19,444 1.5% 
Tasmania 507,626 205,566 City of Hobart: 49,887 24.3% 
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2. The system of government 
 
Constitutionally, the federal government and the states have roughly equal powers:  the 1901 
Australian constitution defined those areas of power granted by the former colonies to the new 
Commonwealth government, and all remaining powers were retained by the states.  However, the 
increasing fiscal dominance of the federal government, through its control of all major direct and 
indirect taxes, and a series of High Court decisions that have extended federal powers in areas such 
as environmental protection and companies law, have resulted in a growing imbalance between the 
two levels of government.  The states are now highly dependent on financial transfers and grants 
from the federal government, which has used its fiscal muscle to play a leading policy role across key 
functional areas that are nominally the province of the states, for example education, health, 
regional development and transport. 
  
Overall federal government expenditure in 2008-09 was $323 billion.  About a third consisted of 
transfers to the states ($97bn) and to local government ($3bn).  Payments by the federal 
government account for about 40 per cent of state revenue for New South Wales and Victoria, and 
up to 60 per cent of revenue for other states.  Federal transfers to local government are relatively 
less important – less than 10% of total local government revenues nationally – but are crucial to the 
survival of small rural and remote authorities.  Most of those transfers are passed through the states 
(in the form of untied financial assistance grants – ‘FAGs’ – distributed by local government grants 
commissions), but an increasing proportion are paid direct to individual local councils. 
 
Local government occupies a somewhat anomalous position in the Australian system.  It is not 
recognized in the federal constitution and is legally a creature of the states, which can and do 
control local government structure and operations in great detail, frequently intervening in specific 
areas of regulation and expenditure.  However, at the same time local governments – especially 
large urban councils – are typically more financially independent than the states:  their functions are 
relatively limited and are matched quite well by their principal sources of revenue – property tax 
(‘rates’) and service fees and charges.3
 
  Moreover, the federal government is now the largest single 
source of external financial support to local government and the two have numerous policy and 
program linkages.  There has been a designated federal government minister for local government 
since the early 1980s, under both Labor and conservative Coalition governments. 
Australia has a well developed system of inter-government relations, although very little of it derives 
from legislation.  The peak body is the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), comprising the 
prime minister, state premiers, territory chief ministers and the president of the Australian Local 
Government Association.  There is also the COAG Reform Council, established to monitor progress 
with, and advise on, various national reform agendas – now including metropolitan planning (see 
below). Sitting under COAG is a series of ministerial councils covering specific functional areas of 
inter-government interest, as well as numerous task forces, advisory committees etc. Until 2010 
these included a Local Government and Planning Ministers Council, but this was abolished as part of 
a streamlining of COAG arrangements, and only partially replaced by an ad hoc local government 
ministerial forum and an associated inter-jurisdictional working group of senior officials. 
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Local government participation in intergovernmental relations is primarily a matter for the 
Australian Local Government Association federally, and its constituent associations in each state and 
the Northern Territory. However, at the national level, the Canberra-based Council of Capital City 
Lord Mayors has also achieved a degree of special recognition from the federal government in urban 
affairs, and the more recently established National Growth Areas Alliance likewise represents rapidly 
developing suburban areas on the metropolitan fringe.   
 
2.1 Metropolitan governance 
As noted at the outset, the dominant force in metropolitan governance is the states:  they are 
responsible for the provision of essential utility services and infrastructure; transport; health, 
education and other major community services; environmental management at the regional level; 
preparation of metropolitan planning strategies; and in most cases approval of major development 
proposals.  The role of local governments varies somewhat from state to state:  typically they 
provide local roads, other small-scale infrastructure and a range of community and regulatory 
services, prepare local strategic and land use plans, and control building and development.  Larger 
local governments can be significant players in metropolitan planning and management – notably in 
South East Queensland (see section 3.2) – but most are relatively small and lack the capacity (and, 
given close oversight by the states, authority) to enhance their influence. 
 
Historically, the federal government has played only a limited role in metropolitan governance, 
although its constitutional powers in areas such as immigration, communications, aviation, taxation 
and economic management set the context for metropolitan growth, and its financial dominance 
over the states allows it to intervene in some metropolitan policy and expenditure decisions – 
notably major infrastructure projects.4  Federal Labor governments have been more engaged in 
metropolitan affairs:  the Whitlam government in the 1970s set up a Department of Urban and 
Regional Development and funded a wide range of urban improvement projects; the Hawke-Keating 
governments of the 1980s and early 1990s likewise implemented a Building Better Cities program.  
The current Labor government has established Infrastructure Australia as a semi-independent body 
to draft and help implement a national program of major projects, including roads and transport 
improvements in metropolitan regions.  It has also created a Major Cities Unit which has developed 
a National Urban Policy5
 
 focused on strategies for the country’s 18 largest cities and metropolitan 
regions – those with populations in excess of 100,000.  However, the longer term significance of 
these moves has yet to become clear (see section 5). 
In addition, at the urging of the federal government, COAG has adopted a set of Criteria for Future 
Strategic Planning of Capital Cities (that is, metropolitan regions).  These are: ‘intended to ensure 
that our cities have robust, transparent and long-term planning systems in place to manage 
population and economic growth, address climate change, improve housing affordability and tackle 
urban congestion.’6  The criteria include a strong focus on effective implementation of metropolitan 
strategies, including clear accountabilities, timelines and performance measures; coordination 
between all three levels of government with opportunities for federal and local government input; 
appropriate consultation and engagement with external stakeholders, experts and the wider 
community; and regular cycles of evaluation and review.7 The COAG Reform Council was 
subsequently tasked to review strategic planning systems against the agreed criteria. It reported 
back to COAG in December 2011 (see section 5).8 
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None of this, however, alters the fact that in the Australian system the states retain the necessary 
constitutional powers and policy and administrative capacity – if not always the required financial 
resources – to conduct effective metropolitan planning and governance.  They directly manage all 
the key areas of responsibility, dominate local government and intervene more or less at will in local 
planning, and also control the rural hinterlands of the capital city regions and related regional 
centres.  Only the South East Queensland region extends across a state border – into the northern 
coastal areas of New South Wales – and even then only to a small extent.  With 60% or more of each 
state’s population living in the metropolitan region, its management is the single most important 
task of every state government.  This is the ‘Australian model’. 
 
The central issue in metropolitan governance thus becomes the way in which state governments 
organise themselves to discharge their responsibilities in an efficient and effective manner.  This is of 
fundamental political importance:  most of the state electorate lives in the metropolitan region and 
voters focus on issues such as the quality of roads and public transport, whether the pattern and 
nature of development is to their liking, the adequacy of open space and recreation facilities, and so 
on. 
 
Yet as the COAG Reform Council’s report confirms, the states’ performance in metropolitan 
management is patchy at best.  Typically, the major bureaucracies and service agencies (some of 
which are corporatized or privatized) – transport, utilities, education, health etc – operate in silos 
with only limited coordination.  Planning departments prepare metropolitan strategies and regulate 
development in conjunction with local government and environmental protection authorities, but in 
practice their powers and influence are usually limited compared to those of big spending 
infrastructure and service agencies.  The latter may be backed by powerful private sector interests 
keen to promote and secure large construction contracts, or enter into lucrative public-private 
partnerships.  Planning systems and decisions are also subject to more direct influence by lobbying 
from the development industry:  in recent years all state governments have moved to centralize 
control over major developments, withdrawing power from local governments that are inclined to 
be more responsive to community and environmental groups.9
 
  
As a result of these pressures, together with those emanating from the rapid pace of growth in most 
metropolitan regions, there has been a tendency for institutional arrangements to be frequently 
reviewed and recast.  In the mid 20th century both Sydney and Melbourne had metropolitan 
organisations with strong local government representation (the Cumberland County Council and the 
Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works respectively), but these were subsequently disbanded 
and replaced by state agencies which have been re-jigged on several occasions since.  Arrangements 
for Adelaide and South East Queensland have been similarly fluid.  Only Perth shows long-term 
continuity (see section 3.1).   
 
Over the past half century most of the state planning agencies have produced two or more major 
strategies to guide metropolitan growth.  While few of their objectives to restructure existing urban 
areas have been fully achieved, these strategies have at least ensured that suburban expansion has 
been reasonably well planned and serviced.  Nevertheless, none of the states has a dedicated agency 
or authority charged specifically and exclusively with coordinating governance and management of 
the metropolitan region.  The Western Australia Planning Commission and ‘Growth Management 
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Queensland’ (now part of the Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning) come 
closest (see section 3).  In some cases infrastructure and service agencies use regional or sub-
regional different boundaries from each other, which may subdivide the metropolitan region.  Thus 
in many ways metropolitan regions are treated no differently to others, although there may be 
special programs or agencies to deal with some aspects of metropolitan planning and governance.  
For example, Perth has a Metropolitan Redevelopment Authority and Queensland an Urban Land 
Development Authority, the former to undertake major urban renewal projects, and the latter to 
improve land supply and promote a range of affordable housing options. Similar arrangements to 
manage urban growth and renewal in selected locations can be found in other states. Invariably they 
weaken or transcend the role of local councils. 
 
As a general rule, local governments in metropolitan regions operate under the same legislation and 
administrative frameworks as apply throughout the state in question, with notionally the same 
powers and functions.  However, there are some qualifications to this generalisation: 
 
 Local government Acts tend to be permissive rather than prescriptive, so that larger, better 
resourced local governments are enabled to take on additional roles. 
 There are usually supplementary Acts for capital-city local governments (that is, the ‘core’ local 
government that includes the seat of state government and main central business district) but 
these are mostly restricted to governance issues, for example providing for direct election of 
mayors and giving some executive powers to the Lord Mayor of Brisbane. 
 Capital-city local governments tend to have a particularly close and sometimes more vexed 
working relationship with state governments, reflecting their shared interests in the state’s 
principal commercial and civic precincts, and in some cases the political prominence of the lord 
mayor. 
 
In summary, Australia has a unique model of metropolitan governance, in which each state 
government is directly responsible for planning and major infrastructure and service delivery in the 
state’s single, dominant urban region.  Local government tends to be fragmented into units that are 
mostly too small to play a major role (although this is changing, especially in South East Queensland 
and potentially in Perth – see below), and there are no ‘upper tier’ metropolitan-scale local 
governments.  The federal government could be a much more significant player, given its financial 
clout, but to date its interventions in metropolitan affairs have been relatively limited and low-key.  
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3.1 Governance framework 
Western Australia is a vast territory of 2.5 million square kilometers, a third of the continent, but 
with a population of only 2.25 million.  Almost three-quarters live in the Perth region, which has a 
population of 1.66 million.  The largest non-metropolitan centre, Bunbury, has a population of about 
60,000, and only three other country towns have more than 20,000 people.10
 
  
This extraordinary settlement pattern is largely a consequence of the nature of the country.  
Western Australia has poor soils and a dry, erratic climate. It offered the first peoples few resources 
and no domesticable plants or animals. Following European settlement, the primary concerns of the 
colonial government were to promote the exploitation of agricultural and mineral resources, and to 
manage the single urban region centred on the Swan River.  Since the colony was established, and 
even with repeated mining booms in the far north and north-west, Perth has always been where 
Western Australia’s wealth is accumulated and where most of its people live. 
 
Figure 2:  Perth Metropolitan Region 
 
 
The result of this cultural inheritance and highly unusual distribution of population has been a strong 
and stable governance structure for the metropolitan region, evolving since Australia’s first explicit 
planning act, the Western Australian Town Planning Act of 1928.  As in the rest of Australia, 
metropolitan governance is primarily a function of the state government and not, as in some other 
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countries, that of local or metropolitan governments.11
 
 The state government has always been the 
direct provider of all major metropolitan services and infrastructure through its various departments 
and agencies. 
The first local town trust was established by the colonial government in 1838, primarily to collect 
tolls and other revenue for building roads.  Over the years, local governments increased in number 
and in the range of their functions, but they remained creatures of the state.  In Western Australia 
there are currently 138 local governments, 30 of them in the Perth metropolitan region (see Figure 
2).  While some are quite large – in Perth there are six with populations between 100,000 and 
200,000 – and while they perform essential functions related to local law-making, infrastructure, 
services, regulation, advocacy and representation, including local delivery of some state government 
programs, they have little influence on the planning and provision of metropolitan infrastructure and 
services or the pattern of development at a regional scale. 
 
3.2 Metropolitan planning and management 
By the 1950s Western Australian governments were correctly anticipating decades of rapid growth 
from immigration, expansion of agriculture, mining and a degree of industrialization, and that meant 
a rapidly growing population in the Perth region.  In 1953 one of the world’s leading planners, 
Gordon Stephenson of Liverpool and Toronto universities, was engaged to prepare a regional plan.12  
In 1960 a Metropolitan Region Planning Authority (comprising representatives of state agencies and 
local government) was appointed to prepare and administer a statutory regional plan, and a 
hypothecated tax was introduced to fund aspects of its implementation – far sighted measures now 
the envy of other Australian states.13
 
  
The Metropolitan Region Planning Authority has since been expanded into a Western Australian 
Planning Commission covering the whole state, but essentially the measures introduced in the 1960s 
remain in place and have in some ways been strengthened.  The longer this system is in place the 
better it gets, for stability is a good thing for strategic planning and metropolitan governance, 
including community engagement, innovation and incremental reform.14
The Commission currently has thirteen members in addition to the executive chair.  Six are the chief 
executives of the key planning, transport, water, environment, housing and state development 
departments.  Others represent local government, Indigenous interests, and expertise in relevant 
disciplines.  The presence of departmental heads ensures that the Commission has a significant role 
in policy development and in the planning of state services and infrastructure.  In addition, the 
Commission’s statutory planning powers and its annual budget of over $100 million give it a 




A characteristic feature of the Commission’s operations is a system of seventeen committees.  These 
afford wide participation in the Commission’s deliberations.  While meetings are necessarily in 
camera – being part of the deliberative process of executive government, committees need to 
explore issues frankly and prepare confidential advice to ministers – they generally involve members 
from outside government and representatives of interest groups and industries.  This introduces a 
diversity of views and helps maintain community confidence.  However, membership of the most 
important committee – the Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, which is the primary state entity 
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for infrastructure planning and coordination – is confined to senior state officials in the interests of 
full and frank debate within government. 
 
As noted earlier, local government in metropolitan Perth remains relatively weak and fragmented, 
especially in the inner and middle suburbs.  There are some arrangements for shared service delivery 
– notably waste management – and also for cooperation in sub-regional planning and policy issues, 
but no overarching metropolitan forum such as the Council of Mayors in South East Queensland (see 
section 3.2).  Fragmentation of local government reflects strong opposition over many years to 
structural reform, but also a decision by the state government in 1994 to divide the then quite large 
central City of Perth into four smaller units.  By contrast, the rapidly growing outer suburbs are 
administered by much larger (in both area and population) local governments – former rural shires 
that have accommodated large-scale urban development – although in one instance the state 
government intervened to divide a shire into two, apparently believing that a single local 
government would become too large.   
 
Pressure has been mounting for some time for a thorough review of local government boundaries in 
metropolitan Perth, and in its 2011 budget the state government announced funding for an 
independent panel to undertake a wide-ranging review of both boundaries and governance 
frameworks (for example, the....).15
http://metroreview.dlg.wa.gov.au
  The panel is due to report to the minister for local government 
in June 2012. It has already released a ‘Findings’ paper that highlights the importance of an 
enhanced strategic approach on the part of both state and local governments to manage 
metropolitan growth, and indicates a need for a substantial reduction in the number of local 
councils, probably to less than a dozen (see ).  
 
In sum, the natural and cultural endowments of Western Australia have produced a specific variant 
of the Australian model of metropolitan governance, characterized by strong state leadership and a 
high degree of stability and coherence in state-dominated institutional arrangements.  Of course this 
does not mean that governance has always been effective and efficient.  It does mean, however, 
that many of the usual distractions and agitations of metropolitan management – divided 
responsibilities, financial inequities, poorly coordinated networks and services – barely exist in Perth.  
It also means, as simple examples, that the level of service on Perth’s roads is the highest of the 
state capitals, that Perth’s metropolitan parks system is the most extensive, and that over a long 
period housing in Perth was the most affordable and medium-density planning approvals were the 
most efficient.16  And as a further, striking example of the nature of governance, it means that in 
something as significant as the redevelopment of the central Perth waterfront (see Figure 3), the 
Perth City Council is little more than an onlooker.  The project is in the hands of the recently 
established Metropolitan Redevelopment Authority, and is described as: ‘Delivered by the State 
Government and supported by the City of Perth.’17
 
 That captures the character of Western 
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Figure 3:  Proposed Redevelopment of Perth Waterfront 
 
Large-scale redevelopment of the Perth waterfront is envisaged to create a new urban  




As noted in section 2, local governments are restricted to property tax and fees and charges as their 
main sources of income, but fortunately this narrow revenue base is matched by their limited 
functions.  By contrast, state governments have far-reaching responsibilities without corresponding 
revenues and are heavily reliant on federal transfers, which amount to around half of state 
revenues. 
 
Tables 4 and 5 show revenues and expenditures of state and local governments in the Perth region 
for 2008-09.  Figures for the state government are estimates only, based on the region’s share of the 
state’s total population, as comprehensive region-specific data is not published.  One explanation for 
this omission is that providing such data would be inherently difficult: 
 
 Allocations would need to estimate the spatial distribution of the benefits of expenditure, not 
simply the location where funds are expended – for instance, the economic benefits from a 
remote road project might accrue in large measure to the metropolitan region, whilst head 
office and other overhead costs incurred in Perth have benefits across the state. 
 Explicit and almost ubiquitous hidden subsidies for state services provided more-or-less equally 
across the state – education, for instance, or policing – would need to be estimated. 
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 Then it might be necessary to estimate where the demand for expenditure is greatest, since the 
needs of the different regions are by no means equal. 
 
An alternative explanation, however, is that governments (not just Western Australia) might not like 
what would emerge from this form of accounting.  It would most likely fuel arguments that certain 
regions are neglected or not getting their ‘fair share’; and that ‘the bush’ is subsidising ‘the city’, or 
perhaps vice versa. 
 
The nearest the state government comes to providing information about the spatial distribution of 
expenditure is to list major projects in each region (see ‘In your area’ at 
www.ourstatebudget.wa.gov.au).  The lists are mainly confined to capital projects, and add up to 
only a small proportion of state government expenditure.  A recent new element is the ‘Royalties for 
the Regions’ program:  this reflects an explicit policy of shifting resources to the non-metropolitan 
regions taken to the last state election by the minor coalition partner (see 
www.royaltiesforregions.wa.gov.au).  Both of these initiatives – the listing of projects by region, and 
the creation of a major funding program for non-metropolitan regions – suggest that there may be 
an unstoppable trend to greater accountability for how state funds are raised and expended across 
the state.  Each step in this direction will be a meaningful improvement in state governance and 
metropolitan governance. 
 
Estimated state government revenues and expenditures in the Perth region are nearly ten times 
those of local government, highlighting the modest role played by the latter.  Local councils 
nevertheless perform crucial and high-profile roles as place makers and place managers, as well as 
being agents of the state and advocates for their districts. 
 
Table 4:  State and local government sources of revenues, Perth region 2008-09 
Revenue Sources State Government* 
Local Government 
(30 councils) 
Local Government Range 
Taxes 29% 50% 31-80% 
User Fees 7% 21% 6-49% 
Other Own Source 20% 13% 0-42% 
Total Own Source 
Revenue 
56% 84% 61-98% 
Inter-government 
Transfers 
44% 16% 2-39% 
Total Revenue $14,361m $1,629m $2-142m 
Total Per Capita $8,656 $982 $622-6088 
*State revenue in the Perth region is an estimate based on the region’s share of total state population. 
Source:  State government data from ABS Catalogue 5512.  Local government data from WA Department of Local 
Government.   
 
The tables also illustrate the very different roles of state and local governments in the management 
of the Perth region.  The state government – which receives nearly half of its revenue in the form of 
federal grants and transfers – is responsible for transport, public safety, environment, education, 
health and other community services.  In most of these areas, the responsibilities of local 
governments are minor to negligible. 
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There are two areas, however, where the collective per capita expenditures of local governments in 
the Perth region are comparable to state per capita expenditure:  transport (where the state 
government spends $711 per capita and local governments spend $232 per capita, chiefly on local 
roads) and parks, recreation and culture ($276 and $222 respectively) – both being responsibilities 
which accord with the place making and place management roles of local governments. 
 
The local government data in Table 5 need to be treated with caution as income and expenditure 
within some categories may vary considerably from year to year (depending, for example, on receipt 
of grants and subsidies, or returns from commercial ventures, sale of land etc), and different local 
governments may allocate expenditure items to different categories. 
 
There is no obvious pattern to total expenditure and the percentage allocation to different 
functions, except that the City of Perth is clearly the highest spending authority.  This reflects its 
command of property tax revenues from the central business district, and its responsibilities for 
managing the city centre and major civic precincts.  The same applies to a lesser extent to the City of 
Fremantle, which includes important commercial, tourism and port facilities.  
 
Table 5:  State and local government patterns of expenditure in the Perth region, 2008-09 
Expenditures State Government* 
Local Government 
(30 councils) 
Local Government Range 
Roads and Transport 8% 25% 0-40% 
Public Safety 11% 3% 0-7% 
Environment 3% 8% 0-24% 
Education 26% - - 
Community Services 40% 7% 0-28% 
Parks, Recreation and 
Culture 
3% 24% 1-40% 
Debt Charges 8% 1% 0-3% 
Other# - 33% 13-70% 
Total Expenditures $14,127m $1,562m $3-155m 
Total Per Capita $8,516 $942 $525-7,279 
*State expenditure in the Perth region is an estimate based on the region’s share of total state population. 
#Includes Community Amenities, Governance and a range of minor expenditures. 
Source: State government data from ABS Catalogue 5512.  Local government data from WA Department of Local 
Government.   
 
A significant feature is the very low level of debt carried by councils – in many cases they are debt 
free.  This reflects an aversion to debt brought about partly by the rhetoric of federal and state 
treasurers, and partly by concerns that local revenues may falter and not prove sufficient to repay 
large loans.  Such limited use of borrowings constrains local government’s ability to undertake 
substantial infrastructure projects. 
 
In terms of the two primary areas of local government expenditure identified earlier – transport, and 
parks, recreation and cultural facilities – the City of Perth spends $2,633 per capita on transport, 
primarily on a comprehensive, state-mandated parking scheme which funds a free bus service 
serving workers, shoppers and visitors in the city center, rather than the small residential 
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population.  Half the metropolitan local governments spend between $200 and $400 per capita, 
mainly on road maintenance and parking services, but with local differences in needs and priorities.  
Three local governments spend up to twice as much:  since these are inner-city, middle-ring and 
outer local governments respectively, they are probably supplying quite different mixes of transport 
products and services.   
 
The City of Perth spends $1,170 per capita on parks, recreation and culture, again primarily serving 
the additional day-time population rather than residents.  Most other metropolitan local 
governments spend between $200 and $300 per capita, while some spend double the average, and 
others only half the average.  The inner-city local governments are at the upper end of the list, the 
middle ring local governments are generally in the middle, and the outer local governments are 
mainly at the lower end of expenditure levels.  This reflects resources and priorities.  The inner-city 
areas are typically wealthier and do not have to meet the demands of rapid growth, while the outer 
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4. South East Queensland 
 
4.1 Governance framework 
South East Queensland (SEQ) comprises eleven local government areas, as shown on Figure 4.  It is a 
multi-centered metropolitan region covering and linking Greater Brisbane, the Sunshine Coast, the 
Gold Coast and Toowoomba.  In June 2009 the estimated population was 3.07m, of which about a 
third lived in the ‘core’ City of Brisbane (1.05m) and most of the remainder in six other large local 
government units:  Gold Coast, Moreton Bay, Sunshine Coast, Logan, Ipswich and Redland.  South 
East Queensland has the four most populous local government areas in Australia, and about 66% of 
the state’s total population.  Projections indicate a regional population of 4.43m by 2031.  
 
At around 23,000 km2, SEQ is also a very large geographic region extending well beyond the developed 
urban area.  Toowoomba is about 100km west of Brisbane, separated from the core city by extensive 
rural areas in Lockyer Valley.  Somerset and Scenic Rim are also mostly rural, with uplands and forests.  
 
Figure 4:  Local governments and population distribution in South East Queensland 2009 
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The City of Brisbane is by far Australia’s largest local government and dominates its region.  It was 
created in 1926 through the amalgamation of twenty local government areas – the only success of 
the vigorous ‘greater city’ movement in Australia at the time. The City contains the seat of state 
government, Queensland’s dominant business center, a major port and industrial complex, and 
extensive suburbs.  It has a distinctive political structure with a popularly elected, semi-executive 
Lord Mayor and 26 full-time councillors each representing a local ward.  Its budget is around US$2 
billion per annum.  Although suburban growth has now extended well beyond its boundaries, the 
City remains pre-eminent in the region and will continue to grow strongly, mainly through urban 
renewal and increased residential densities.  By 2031 it will still have around 30% of the SEQ 
population and remain the region’s dominant commercial and industrial hub. 
 
Nevertheless, as applies across Australia, the state government is the dominant provider of 
infrastructure and services, leads strategic planning and controls major developments.  The structure 
thus conforms to the ‘Australian model’ summarized above.  But local government in Queensland is 
financially and politically stronger than in other states, and carries some increased responsibilities, 
notably for infrastructure (especially water supply and sewerage), and in the case of the City of 
Brisbane, buses and river ferries. In March 2008, the Queensland government reduced the number 
of local governments in the state from 156 to 72, and in SEQ from 18 to 11, with just 7 for the main 
urban areas (excluding Toowoomba).  The Reform Commission that recommended the new 
boundaries had identified a need for local governments that could manage the challenges of growth.  
It called for: 
 
a local government structure which responds to the particular characteristics of the regional economies 
emerging over the coming decades, recognizing communities of interest are developing rapidly and 
differently across the regions due to improved transportation, telecommunications and economic 
interdependencies.  This structure needs to give rise to local governments capable of responding to the 
sometimes quite diverse demands by these communities and be of a sufficient size and scale to generate 
cost efficient and effective services.18
 
  
All the new SEQ local governments have popularly elected mayors who meet under the aegis of the 
Council of Mayors of South East Queensland (COMSEQ).  This replaced the former SEQ Regional 
Organization of Councils, which had long played a significant role in representing local government’s 
interests to state and federal governments, particularly in regional planning.  COMSEQ facilitates 
extensive cooperation on policy issues and special projects, but to date there has been little or no 
formal shared service delivery amongst its members. 
 
Apart from Brisbane City’s role in public transport, all SEQ local governments have the same 
statutory responsibilities for infrastructure, service delivery, planning and regulation.  The local 
government Act, like those in most other states, is permissive rather than prescriptive, and local 
governments have considerable scope to fine-tune their functions and priorities according to local 
needs and demands.  For example, Gold Coast City has decided to part-fund a major light rail project, 
although it is under no obligation to do so.  Its decision reflects the relative financial strength of the 
large SEQ local governments, coupled with the need for improved infrastructure to support rapid 
growth (see below). 
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4.2 Metropolitan planning and management 
After decades of inattention to metropolitan issues, the Queensland Government embarked in the 
1990s on a series of significant reforms to both regional planning and later local government. Thus 
like Perth, SEQ has a well articulated framework for metropolitan planning and growth management, 
in this case focused on the SEQ Regional Planning Committee (RPC), other regional and sub-regional 
committees, and a leading state agency (now ‘Growth Management Queeensland’ within the 
Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning).  The current SEQ Regional Plan 
2009-2031 covers the whole metropolitan region, and again as in Perth, it is a statutory document, 
legally made by the responsible state minister under Queensland’s Sustainable Planning Act 2009. 
 
The RPC has operated in various forms for two decades.  Uniquely in Australian metropolitan 
planning, it is a political rather than technical committee, reflecting in part the more equal 
relationship between state and local government in Queensland.  It consists of eight state ministers, 
five mayors and a federal representative, and is chaired by the state planning minister.  The 
committee has sought to strengthen links with the federal government by having the latter appoint 
a political representative, rather than an official. 
 
Community, business and environmental groups are not directly represented on the RPC, but they 
are included in various sub-committees that report to the committee, state agencies and local 
governments.  Also, in early 2010 the former premier convened a ‘Growth Summit’ bringing together 
a broad range of government and non-government stakeholders to discuss current and emerging 
issues. 
 
As in other states, the key players in metropolitan management are the large state infrastructure 
and service agencies.  These are linked through state cabinet and other ministerial arrangements, as 
well as numerous regional, sub-regional and sectoral inter-departmental committees.  However, the 
Queensland government has strengthened these arrangements in several ways: 
 
 Through the regional planning structures and processes already described. 
 By appointing a Coordinator General with powers under the State Development and Public 
Works Organisation Act 1971 (a position originally created in 1938). 
 By establishing a state department with responsibilities for growth management, infrastructure 
and, until recently, local government; the Translink Transit Authority to coordinate 
transportation network planning and service delivery; and an Urban Land Development 
Authority to facilitate some major renewal projects and new suburban developments. 
 By adopting a 20-year SEQ Infrastructure Plan and Program that complements the regional plan 
and is linked to the annual budget process.  
 
Although some elements are longstanding, this framework is of recent origin and it remains to be 
seen how effectively it will generate the required focus on a coordinated approach to metropolitan 
governance and management.19  For example, the pressures of recovery from the damage caused by 
the recent severe floods in South East Queensland, and by cyclones and flooding in the far north, 
may divert the attention of the state government for some time. This points to a significant 
weakness in the ‘Australian model’, namely that state governments have wide-ranging and often 
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pressing responsibilities in addition to metropolitan governance, and needs elsewhere may take 
precedence. 
 
Funding rapid expansion of infrastructure and services is also of concern.  The current rate of 
investment in major projects in SEQ (around $3-4 billion per annum) is insufficient to meet long term 
needs, and there are already serious backlogs.  Annual expenditure needs to double in order to 
complete key projects over the next two decades.  The level of future federal government support 
will be a critical factor (see section 4.2). 
 
Another disturbing factor could be emerging distrust between state and local governments.  As 
noted earlier, SEQ local governments are larger and more influential than their counterparts 
elsewhere in Australia, and over recent decades, led by Brisbane City Council, they have enjoyed a 
more collaborative and respectful relationship with the state government.  However, this has been 
undermined to some degree by the recent amalgamations, state intervention to restructure local 
government water and sewerage entities, and tensions over increasing state control of major 
planning and development projects. John Abbott has noted that: 
 
The collaborative dynamics in SEQ need to be strengthened and revitalised by improving the capacity for 
joint action by GMQ [Growth Management Queensland] and COMSEQ and by leadership by state and local 
governments. Resources for an expanded SEQ policy focus around the RPC secretariat in GMQ would 
improve the capacity for joint action. The next review of the SEQRP [Regional Plan] is expected to 
commence in 2012 and this will provide opportunities for both state and local governments to show 




Perhaps the recent election as premier of the former Lord Mayor of Brisbane, who has averred a 
commitment to strong local government, will ensure a productive relationship.  
 
4.3 Finance 
Tables 6 and 7 show revenues and expenditures of state and local governments in the SEQ region for 
2008-09.  The figures exclude Toowoomba, which, although nominally part of SEQ, is functionally 
quite separate and a major regional centre in its own right. Again, the local government data need to 
be treated as indicative only due to annual variations and differing accounting practices from one 
council to another. 
 
The general comments made at the beginning of section 4.1 with respect to state revenue and 
expenditure apply equally to Queensland.  As in the case of Western Australia, nearly half of 
Queensland government revenues come from federal grants.  Queensland has been a low-taxing 
state even within the confines of the options available to it.  According to the Queensland 
government’s own budget papers, the state’s tax effort, as measured by the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission, was more than 13% below the national average in 2008-09, and this gap appears to be 
widening.  Future levels of federal support could thus be critical in determining the state’s ability to 
fund essential infrastructure.  
 
Local government revenues and expenditures are dwarfed by those of the state.  As in Western 
Australia, a regional breakdown of state expenditure is not available, but applying population ratios 
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to total state expenditure and using Australian Bureau of Statistics data produces a figure of about 
$24.5 billion for SEQ in 2008-09, approximately $8,350 per capita.  This is roughly six times greater 
than local government – even in a metropolitan region with unusually strong local governments. It 
again reflects the state’s responsibility for major services and infrastructure. 
 
Table 6:  State and local government sources of revenue, SEQ 2008-09 
Revenue Sources State Government* 
Local Government 
(10 councils) 
Local Government Range 
Taxes 24% 33% 25-39% 
User Fees 10% 40% 28-48% 
Other Own Source 25% 13% 3-22% 
Total Own Source Revenue 59% 85% 68-92% 
Inter-government Transfers 41% 15% 8-32% 
Total Revenue $24,568m $4,657m $44-1,834m 
Total Per Capita $8,363 $1,585 $1,099-2,037 
* State revenue in SEQ is an estimate based on the region’s share of total state population. 
Source: State government data calculated from ABS catalogue 5512. Local government data from Queensland Department 
of Local Government and Planning.  
 
Table 6 indicates some significant variations in revenue patterns and total revenue per capita within 
local government.  Logan and Moreton Bay are low taxing local governments (property tax per 
capita), whilst Brisbane and Gold Coast received relatively little by way of inter-government 
transfers.  Nevertheless, Brisbane had the highest revenue per capita (both own source and total) by 
a substantial margin, perhaps reflecting in part its additional functions in public transport.  However, 
its level of property tax per capita was exceeded by Gold Coast, which is perhaps surprising given 
Brisbane’s command of the central business district and major industrial areas.  
 
Grants and subsidies (inter-government transfers) as a percentage of total revenue ranged from 
8.5% for Gold Coast and 10% for Brisbane to a narrow range of 15-20% for most of the remainder, 
which is fairly typical of urban local governments.  Of that amount, general purpose federal 
assistance grants accounted for somewhat more than half. 
 
The expenditure figures in Table 7 underscore the sharp differences between local and state 
government responsibilities. They also reveal a fairly typical local government pattern with a strong 
emphasis on roads, waste management, aspects of planning and environmental control, and parks 
and recreation.  As applies across Australia, local government plays only a minor role in public order 
and safety and social services, including health and education.  Brisbane City has by far the highest 
total expenditure, reflecting its population, and also leads (but to a much lesser extent) in per capita 
expenditure.  However, there is no general correlation between size and expenditure.  Two large 
local governments, Moreton Bay and Logan, have low levels of per capita expenditure. 
 
  
THE AUSTRALIAN MODEL OF METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE:  




Table 7:  State and local government patterns of expenditure in SEQ, 2008-09 
Expenditures State Government* Local Government Local Government Range 
Roads and Transport 16% 23% 15-54% 
Public Safety 9% 2% 1-4% 
Environment 4% 11% 4-19% 
Education 22% 1% 0-5% 
Community Services 35% - - 
Parks, Recreation and Culture 25 12% 5-24% 
Planning and Development  n/a 7% 4-12% 
Debt Charges 2% - - 
Other# 11% 51% 11-55% 
Total Expenditures $24,540m $3,764m $26-1,666m 
Total Per Capita $8,354 $1,167 $793-1,583 
* State expenditure in SEQ is an estimate based on the region’s share of total state population. Planning and development 
is not separately identified. 
^ Excludes most capital expenditure. 
# Includes administration and a range of minor expenditures. 
Source: State government data calculated from ABS catalogue 5512 data. Local government data from Queensland 
Department of Local Government and Planning.  
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5. Insights and Challenges 
 
Australia’s major metropolitan regions will continue to grow rapidly, and there is increasing 
community concern about the environmental and social impacts of urban growth.  Whilst Australian 
cities continue to rate highly on international scales of livability, there is a popular perception that 
quality of life and that of major urban services – public transport, education and health – is declining, 
at least relative to rising community expectations.21
 
  
Governments at all levels are thus faced with the challenge of providing for both growth and 
improvement, and it is questionable whether this can be achieved within current policy settings.22
 
  
As noted earlier, there are already some significant backlogs in infrastructure systems, notably public 
transport, due to under-investment over recent decades.  At both federal and state levels, 
governments have sought to reduce their share of GDP, lower taxes and limit borrowing.  In the case 
of the states, these policies have tended to compound the difficulties they face due to their limited 
tax base.  Whilst public-private partnerships have been used for some major infrastructure projects, 
notably toll roads but also public transport and hospitals, these have not always proved financially 
viable or satisfactory in practice.  Hence calls for the federal government to play a larger role and 
lend its financial support. 
Investment in metropolitan infrastructure and services is also subject to competition from regional 
development, especially the need for similar high levels of public investment in Australia’s resource-
rich regions that provide the mineral exports essential for national wealth and wellbeing.  As well, 
significant policy conflicts need to be addressed:  for example, maintenance of housing affordability 
is seen to require downward pressure on infrastructure charges levied on residential development, 
but how otherwise is infrastructure to be funded?  
 
Unless these critical financial and policy issues can be resolved – which would seem to require 
governments, business and the community to face up to the need for higher taxes and/or charges, 
possibly increased land tax or congestion pricing as suggested in the Henry tax review23
 
 – it is 
difficult to see adjustments to metropolitan governance and planning arrangements having much 
strategic impact.  True, governments can seek to ensure that public funds are expended wisely and 
efficiently, that the private sector is given sound guidance, that new suburbs and renewal areas are 
located advantageously, and that adverse environmental impacts are reduced; but the underlying 
problems will continue to accumulate. 
Nevertheless, if resources can be increased, the ‘Australian model’ of state governments being 
responsible for both metropolitan regions and their hinterlands, and directly providing most 
services, can provide a platform for sound integrated planning and governance.  Both Perth and SEQ 
offer valuable insights into the types of arrangements that can prove effective.  At this stage, 
however, neither provides adequately for enhanced federal government involvement, should that 
develop, nor fuller participation by local government.   
 
The need for a stronger focus on integrated strategic planning was highlighted in the review of 
metropolitan planning systems by the COAG Reform Council. The Council recommended that: 
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...COAG note that none of the capital city strategic planning systems were found to be wholly consistent 
with the agreed criteria...  
 
COAG should encourage governments to continue to focus their efforts on improved integration—
complementary and consistent planning and delivery across relevant parts of government, especially 
transport, economic development and land use, including:  
 
• integration within governments, including the Commonwealth as well as State and Territory, and local 
governments  
• integration between governments, based on continued collaboration.  
 
The Council also emphasised the importance of better data and evidence-based policy, frameworks 




At the same time, the recently released National Urban Policy clearly envisages a stronger role for 
the federal government in metropolitan policy and governance.  It quotes the OECD’s view that: 
Urban issues have emerged as key features of national policy agendas.  The importance of cities and their 
metropolitan areas to the national economy as well as their strategic role as global nodes in international 
markets has led governments to renew their support for cities.  The concept of urban policy transcends 




The policy then argues that: 
How the Australian Government plans and coordinates its activities has direct and indirect impact on our 
cities; from how the Australian Government works with State and Territory governments to fund 
infrastructure, through to how we structure our investment in health and education  services.   
 
The Australian Constitution establishes that State and Territory governments have principal responsibility 
for the planning and management of cities.  Nevertheless, since Federation, the Australian Government 
has had a substantial role in cities through:  direct investment in housing and social and economic 
infrastructure and economic policy settings; property ownership; labour market regulation, immigration 
and taxation policies; and regulatory functions.  In this way, over the years, the Australian Government 
has helped to shape our cities.  This involvement has not always been based on clear principles and 
objectives. 
 
There has been strong support for the Australian Government to increase its involvement and leadership 
in cities.  The National Urban Policy outlines how the Australian Government’s future actions will be 
shaped to produce better outcomes for our cities.26
 
  
The current federal government has already committed substantial funding to major infrastructure 
projects, notably urban transport, but the sums involved fall far short of what the states need.  Nor 
is there any clear indication that the National Urban Policy will be accompanied by an increased and 
ongoing financial commitment to address the issues raised.  Indeed, for the foreseeable future the 
federal government will be focused on fiscal tightening to bring its budget back into surplus 
following massive stimulus spending during the Global Financial Crisis, as well as the heavy cost of 
disaster recovery after recent cyclones and floods. 
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This leaves the continuing vexed issue of the appropriate role, scale and structures of local 
government in metropolitan governance and management.27  Queensland has amalgamated local 
governments into (by Australian standards) exceptionally large units in pursuit of ‘strategic capacity’ 
– enhanced financial strength, know-how, productivity, creativity and ability to cope with change.28
 
  
It is too early to determine whether these objectives will be achieved:  Brisbane City Council is 
widely regarded as a successful model, but has had nearly a century to mature.  Moreover, it is not 
clear that the Queensland state government has reached a firm ‘whole of government’ conclusion 
on the kind of role it wants the big new local governments to play: the former Labor administration’s 
establishment of the Urban Land Development Authority to take over from local government in 
planning major development projects suggested contradictory policy settings. Those may now be 
reviewed under the new Liberal-National government. 
Local governments in Western Australia have fewer functions and less influence than in Queensland, 
and there is little sign that this will change, even if the current review leads to much larger local 
governments in the metropolitan region. Indeed, the fragmentation of local governments in the 
Perth region may have been of little consequence in terms of metropolitan outcomes – although 
their sheer number undoubtedly impaired their ability to collaborate or negotiate with the state 
government, and in many cases their limited fiscal and organisational resources would have reduced 
their capacity to enhance community wellbeing as local ‘place shapers’ and ‘place managers’.   
 
Thus whilst local government consolidation may well be desirable for other reasons, especially if 
councils are expected to play a stronger role in urban management, the existence of numerous, 
relatively small local governments does not necessarily equate with fragmentation of metropolitan 
governance.  Under the ‘Australian model’ of direct state government control, issues of efficiency, 
equity and environmental quality can be managed within one jurisdiction across the metropolitan 
region and the state, and coordination of key agencies could be achieved relatively easily – provided 
the states organise themselves appropriately.  In fact, any large-scale devolution of additional 
powers and resources to local governments – even large units – could generate wholly new 
problems of intra-metropolitan equity, horizontal fiscal imbalance, and inefficiencies in service 
provision.  Similarly, transfer of significant functions to a new ‘tier’ of metropolitan government – 
which might have a bigger budget than the residual state government – could raise issues of equity 
between the metropolitan region and its hinterland, and may tend to disenfranchise the third of the 
population living in the rest of the state.29
 
  
Notwithstanding those doubts, there may well be a case for the states to establish – or in some 
cases re-establish – metropolitan ‘commissions’ or the like that would provide ‘more explicit 
metropolitan governance.’30
 
  These might comprise a mix of state appointees and indirectly elected 
representatives of local government, similar to the former Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of 
Works and Perth Metropolitan Region Planning Authority.  They could provide a responsible forum 
and focus for coordination of metropolitan planning, services and infrastructure, and for the 
expression of metropolitan community views and aspirations.  
What is missing is an intervening layer for the negotiation of state and local development ambitions at the 
regional level.  And yet there exists no mechanism for consultation, clarification and leadership at the 
regional level.  These critical ends cannot be met within the confines of municipal politics and 
government.  Urban local government amalgamations in jurisdictions such as Queensland and Victoria 
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An alternative – or complementary – approach was set out in the Cities for the 21st Strategy for 
Sydney published by the then NSW Department of Planning in 1995. It proposed: 
 
...a new integrated urban management approach [that] seeks to supplement or improve existing 
management mechanisms through better consideration of the vision, goals and key principles of the 
Strategy. It provides a framework within which the actions and policies of key decision makers can be 
coordinated and integrated. It also provides a reference point for budget allocation decisions.  
 
The Strategy also provides a context within which other arms of government can use the collegiate 
approach [emphasis added] to prepare strategies, policies and plans...32
 
 
The department went on to propose a mix of measures comprising an Urban Policy Committee of 
Cabinet; an officer-level Metropolitan Strategy Committee including local government 
representation; four regional sub-committees and four sectoral committees, all with local 
government participation; a Transport Task Force; a Community Reference Group; a Metropolitan 
Strategy Monitoring Unit that would amongst other things facilitate links to the state budget; and 
annual Metro Forums involving a broad range of stakeholders that would receive reports from the 
various committees. These proposals were never fully implemented so the potential worth of the 
department’s approach cannot be assessed. 
  
By the same token, it seems clear that local government needs to do more to promote regional and 
sub-regional collaboration between councils. The SEQ Council of Mayors is a relatively well 
resourced regional organisation able to play a significant role in advocacy, metropolitan planning 
and management of special projects, but its role in ‘day to day’ coordination of local government’s 
contribution to metropolitan management remains very limited. In Perth, there is no region-wide 
local government entity to facilitate coordination of council activities or planning and policy 
development: councils do work together in five sub-regional organisations but their role is confined 
largely to waste management.  
 
The underlying theme here, as John Abbott points out, is that successful planning and management 
of metropolitan areas demands effective mechanisms for collaborative governance: 
 
The processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people 
constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private 
and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished.33
 
 
From his assessment of recent approaches to regional planning for South East Queensland, Abbott 
concludes that collaborative governance arrangements need to extend to the federal government 
and business and community stakeholders, but at their core require leadership by both state and 
local governments and shared experience, knowledge and commitment on their part in the 
development and effective implementation of metropolitan strategies.34
 
 
Collaborative governance can take various forms. Nevertheless, in the Australian context the 
fundamental issue remains the capacity and performance of the states as metropolitan managers.  
Will they have adequate resources to do the job, and will they align planning, governance and 
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agency structures in order to do the job well?  The federal government can certainly help by 
ensuring that its own policy settings are supportive, and especially by providing essential financial 
support.  Local governments can enhance their role in the effective governance of places and 
communities, larger councils could make a greater contribution to metropolitan management in 
their own right, and local government generally could strengthen its capacity through increased 
(sub) regional cooperation and resource sharing. Amalgamation of local government areas may well 
be appropriate in some instances. But if critical challenges are to be met, and desired outcomes 
achieved, the states must more explicitly acknowledge and accept their responsibilities as 
metropolitan (as well as state) governments. The ‘Australian model’ requires them to give integrated 
metropolitan governance and planning the priority it deserves, and to place it at the centre of their 
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